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Montana judicial elections: Does
the past hold lessons for future?
By Anthony Johnstone
University of Montana's Alexander Blewett Ill School of Law
Montanans never much liked outside influence in their
judiciary, and their first line of defense was judicial elections.
This may strike us as odd now, in our Citizens United era of
unlimited outside money and even national party politics enter-
ing our Supreme Court campaigns. Yet the outsider problem
and our electoral solution are older than statehood itself. After
seeing record amounts of money spent on court candidates in
the last campaign, and with three seats on the ballot this fall, it
is worth considering where we've been and where we're headed
on Montana's judicial campaign trail.
Judicial elections arose two centuries ago as a democratic
solution to the problem of political influence on judges. Under
the traditional model still used by the federal government and a
few states, judges owed their appointments to the executive and
legislative branches. In such a system, the composition of the
judiciary is neither independent of the political branches-wit-
ness the present gaming of the United States Supreme Court
vacancy-nor directly accountable to the people. Most states
have taken the alternative path of judicial elections. Today, with
about 90 percent of state judges subject to election, judicial elec-
tions are not going away anytime soon.
A history of Montana's judicial elections
The origins of judicial elections in Montana date back 150
years to a suspicion of the political appointees who staffed the
territorial courts. In the gold rush that opened Montana's ter-
ritorial history, customary miners' courts and the storied vigi-
lantes dispensed civil and criminal justice. Acting Gov. Thomas
Meagher, a Union Democrat, chafed against federal influence
over the new territory. He pushed for statehood in 1866 with
a constitutional convention and two extraordinary legisla-
tive sessions. When a two-member majority of the territorial
court, both Republicans, declared the acts of the extraordinary
sessions null and void, the state legislature redistricted those
justices to the wilderness. The Republican U.S. Congress retali-
ated by nullifying all laws enacted in the extraordinary sessions,
revoking the legislature's judicial districting power, and raising
the territorial judges' salaries by $1,000.
Once the territorial government settled in, Montana courts
developed a reputation for efficiency. Yet residents still resented
the courts' lack of democratic legitimacy. On the eve of the sec-
ond Montana constitutional convention in 1884, one newspa-
per editorial captured the popular complaint that
[t]he President has nominated another
carpetbagger for Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of Montana. Seventy-five thousand people
in the Territory to make laws for themselves, and
a Hoosier sent out from Indiana to tell us what we
have done. How long, oh Lord; how long!
The proposed 1884 Constitution reflected this suspicion
of outside influence. In its memorial to Congress, the conven-
tion sought statehood to redress "the policy which has so long
prevailed of sending strangers to rule over us and fill our of-
fices." The convention's address to voters devoted more lines to
grievances against the appointed judiciary than it devoted to the
legislative and executive branches combined:
The present system is manifestly wrong again; by
it the people have no voice in selecting the judges.
They are sent to us from the far off East, probably
in deference to the traditional idea that it was
from thence all of the "wise men" came.... The
character of our litigation is such that, however
learned in the law our eastern judge may be, he
will find himself much embarrassed in his new
field.
In the proposal, justices would be "elected by the people" for
six-year terms, and would be "required to have resided in the
State or Territory at least two years prior to their election." The
1889 Constitution retained both provisions.
With statehood, Montana's judiciary transitioned from
federal appointees unfamiliar with mining law to state elected
officials all too familiar with corporate overreach and cor-
ruption. In what came to be known as the War of the Copper
Kings, William A. Clark, Marcus Daly, and F. Augustus Heinze
engaged in a decades-long struggle for domination of Butte's
"richest hill on earth," and incidentally, for control of the state's
government-including its courts. The Montana Supreme
Court later recounted the broad history of "[t]hose tumultuous
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years ... marked by rough contests tor political and economic
domination primarily in the mining center of Butte, between
mining and industrial enterprises controlled by foreign trusts or
corporations."
Some of those rough contests played out before elected state
judges. Heinze waged litigation in state courts to hold the rival
Amalgamated Copper Company at bay while he, sometimes
literally, mined ore out from under the company's feet. One of
the judges hearing Heinze's case, William Clancy, "found in
Heinze's favor with monotonous regularity" in what the histo-
rian K. Ross Toole memorably termed "a burlesque of judicial
dignity." In 1903, after two devastating blows in Judge Clancy's
court, Amalgamated shut down its operations until winning the
enactment of a "Fair Trials" law allowing the peremptory sub-
stitution of a district judge. (A descendent of the "Clancy Rule"
remains in effect today.) Heinze sold out to Amalgamated after
Clancy lost re-election. Yet the War of the Copper Kings left
lasting scars, as the Anaconda Company consolidated power
over state government in Montana.
It took the one-person one-vote revolution, and reappor-
tionment of the state legislature in 1965, to dethrone Anaconda.
The new legislature moved toward constitutional reform and
a more accountable state government. As with the earlier con-
stitutions, judicial selection emerged as a central concern. In a
1967 "Blueprint for Modernization," Professors David Mason
and William Crowley offered a variant of the "Missouri Plan"
of merit panel selection, a reform that had failed five times in
Montana since 1945. When the Constitutional Convention del-
egates met in early 1972, Sandra Muckelston's detailed commis-
sion report explained that "[t]he major criticism of the elective
system of judicial selection, be it partisan [as Montana's system
was before 1935] or non-partisan, is that voter knowledge of
candidates and their qualifications is insufficient to form a basis
for a rational choice." A judicial candidate also might "depend
upon contributions from 'friends,' which may affect his impar-
tiality just us much as those judges who receive financial sup-
port from party coffers." One Montana justice estimated that he
spent nine months of an election year campaigning for office.
These studies set the stage for an unusually deliberative
discussion of judicial selection by the 100 elected delegates of
the Constitutional Convention. The 24 lawyer-delegates car-
ried on most of the debate among themselves. The delegates'
consideration of the judicial article was among the longest
and most divided at the convention. The Judiciary Committee
divided five-to-four on the issue of judicial selection. Despite
the convention's general atmosphere of bipartisanship, the
Judiciary Committee's votes divided largely along party lines.
Democrats in the majority would retain judicial elections, while
the predominantly Republican minority noted it was "especially
apprehensive of the future political character of [Montana's]
judges," and proposed merit selection.
Although the Montana Bar Association and leading judges
supported a merit selection plan, the Judiciary Committee's poll
of nearly 500 lawyers in the state found that a slight majority
favored judicial elections; over 100 members of the Montana
Trial Lawyers Association favored elections by more than a
two-to-one margin. Delegate John M. Schiltz, a former legis-
lator and an unsuccessful candidate for chief justice in 1970,
made a case for judicial elections based on personal and politi-
cal history. In Montana, he explained, "we have strong corpo-
rate influence; where, if I can elect a Governor, and through
that office nominate and appoint the district and the Supreme
Court judges, I can run this state.... I can own it." Noting how
the Anaconda Company and its former affiliate the Montana
Power Company could dominate appointment processes,
including the Constitutional Convention Commission itself, he
concluded
you cannot pick a committee in the State of
Montana that will be totally free of that kind of
influence. And I am afraid of it, and if I have to
choose between one or the other, I'm going to the
electorate every time, because I had a chance . .. to
be elected. With another few bucks, I might have
made it.
Noted lawyer-delegate James C. Garlington argued for ju-
dicial appointment. "There is clear agreement on the part of all
that we do need good judges," he noted, "[t]he question is how
to recruit them." He suggested that campaigns make judicial
office unattractive for many good lawyers because the judicial
candidate "must sever himself completely from the private
practice of law."
In a series of divided votes the delegates rejected both the
majority and minority proposals and adopted Article VII, sec-
tion 8, whose original text suggests its complicated origins in
both the minority and majority proposals. The result was the
maintenance of contested judicial elections, but with a merit
plan of appointment by nominees from a selection committee
in case of vacancies. Based on a campaign that noted, reveal-
ingly, "[c]ontested election of judges is not changed," the people
narrowly ratified the 1972 Constitution, including the new
judicial article.
Reformers were discouraged by the implementation of the
compromise judicial article. Delegate Mason Melvin regretted
that "the Legislature tossed the mechanics of the appointment
of judges right into the political kettle" by giving the governor
the power to appoint the majority of the nominating com-
mission. Delegate Jean Bowman observed the Constitution
"bungles the method of selection process," because it "provides
for neither pure election nor merit selection and, at best, con-
stitutionalizes uncertainty in the constitution in the method of
selection." The judge for whom Delegate Bowman later clerked,
Justice John C. Harrison, reached a harsher judgment: the
"worst judiciary article in fifty states." The legislature and voters
appear to agree that the convention left room for improvement.
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The judicial article is among the most frequently amended
articles in the Montana Constitution, with voters approving all
four constitutional referenda amending the article.
Notably, the convention delegates also debated an in-
novative plan for public financing of judicial campaigns. The
Judiciary Committee proposed a section requiring the legisla-
ture to "appropriate funds for the contested general election
campaign expenses of candidates for the offices of justices of
the supreme court and district court judges." Unlike the judicial
selection proposal, the public-financing proposal enjoyed broad
support on the committee. It recognized "the same problems
we have always had" with judges running for office, including
"the necessity that the judge demean himself and his position
by seeking campaign funds," the influence of lawyers' contribu-
tions, and "the fact that the appearance of justice suffers in the
process.
The committee's solution to these problems prompted a
prescient discussion of campaign finance in judicial elections.
Delegate Schiltz opened the debate on the public-financing
provision, noting that the cost to taxpayers of financing judicial
elections was a "pittance in view of the benefits," including an
"independent Judiciary" and assurance "that one man was not
buying the job." Looking toward a future of big-money cam-
paigns, he warned that "this is going to come to Montana, and I
can think of no other, better place to start as an experiment for
a very small amount of money than on the Judiciary." The del-
egates gave the public-financing proposal preliminary approval
by a narrow margin, but voted later that day to reconsider the
proposal. Delegate William Burkhardt reported that a lawyer
friend wrote to him that he hoped it would be "well debated
before its death." So it was.
Several lawyers spoke in support of public financing.
Delegate Wade Dahood argued "only the so-called 'big boys'
can afford to support [candidates] with enough campaign
funds," and "subconsciously, at least, it has an effect upon their
decision." Delegate and Convention President Leo Graybill
asked whether the delegates were "going to let the Judiciary
continue to get its money to run for contested Supreme Court
offices by getting it from big ... corporations and concerns who
have a lot of litigation in the Supreme Court." To the criticism
that public financing would simply relieve lawyers from fund-
ing judicial campaigns, Delegate Graybill continued by assert-
ing that "[t]he people that it's going to relieve is the common
people who have to go to that Supreme Court occasionally
against some major interest who is there constantly."
Opponents, however, doubted that the legislature would
provide sufficient funding, and asked why only the judi-
ciary should receive public campaign financing. Delegate Joe
Eskildsen, originally a proponent of the proposal, argued that
"when you look for political office, then you got to expect to
find your own campaign funds and to finance it yourself."
Delegate Garlington raised free speech concerns, worried that
the measure would "inhibit the rights of citizen groups to take
an interest in" judicial elections. Delegate William Swanberg,
another lawyer, raised concerns about circumvention: "[T]he
state will be on the [hook] for the basic campaign expenses, and
some candidate will find some way of getting around it." The
delegates then voted to delete the provision.
Two weeks later, Delegate Rick Champoux returned to the
proposal, arguing "if we don't provide the expenses for these
judges, somebody else will, and that other group will be, in the
main, large companies that come before this court, whether
they do it directly or indirectly." In response, the delegates sus-
pended the rules to reconsider the proposal, but only as applied
to Supreme Court justices. This time, the delegates adopted the
proposal by 55 votes to 32. All that remained was final consider-
ation of the judicial article. The convention adopted the first 13
sections - including the compromise judicial-selection section
- by wide margins. But in a final vote, the public-financing
proposal fell short. What would have been a major reform of
state judicial elections failed by just two votes.
The new normal of judicial elections in Montana
The failure of the public financing proposal left open the
door to increasingly expensive privately funded judicial cam-
paigns. This, in turn, exposed judicial elections to the eventual
deregulation of campaign finance that culminated with Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission in 2010. Although
that case is associated with corporate speech rights - an idea
already established in constitutional doctrine - it primarily
holds that unlimited campaign spending cannot corrupt the
political process as long as the money is not contributed directly
to a candidate. The Montana Supreme Court took a lonely stand
against the case in American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock,
trying to distinguish Montana's campaigns, including judicial
campaigns, from the presidential campaign at issue in Citizens
United. Yet Montana drew a quick rebuke from the Supreme
Court. As a result, many of the legal and ethical constraints on
judicial campaign speech and finance, once a realm of electoral
exceptionalism respecting the distinct office of a judge, have
fallen alongside their political-campaign analogues.
Following Citizens United, political parties now are as free to
endorse nonpartisan judicial candidates as they are to endorse
partisan political candidates. Corporations and unions now are
as free to spend unlimited amounts in judicial campaigns, just
as they may in political campaigns. Contributors now are free
to choose their preferred levels of disclosure by selecting among
candidate campaigns, super PACs, or less transparent vehicles.
Careful contributors may enjoy significant influence in can-
didate campaigns - judicial or political - without triggering
either a disqualifying conflict or even the obligation to identify
themselves. Even campaign contribution limits, not at issue in
Citizens United itself, have been lifted by a recent constitutional
challenge in Montana.
Meanwhile, state courts remain important players in in-
creasingly polarized debates concerning state law and politics.
One-party state legislatures and executive branches, encouraged
by historically large legislative margins, test state courts with
contentious laws and constitutional questions. In states where
a balance of power once encouraged political compromise, the
losing party now may resort to litigation. The same moneyed
interests that help set the legislative agenda also loom over state
courts. Those judges and justices must decide the high-stakes
and politically charged cases that follow, knowing their deci-
sions may set the course for their next election campaigns. A
moderate judge who does not line up neatly with moneyed
interests risks electoral defeat. Case by case, issue by issue, term
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Financing of contested Montana judicial campaigns
The chart below shows contested Supreme Court candidate
financing since 1990, in 2014 dollars. Fully disclosed can-
didate contributions accounted for the majority of judicial
$900,000
campaign spending from 1990 - the earliest existence of
detailed campaign finance records in Montana - until the
U. S. Supreme Court's 2010 Citizens United decision.
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by term, the polarization of the political
branches runs to the courts. This is the
new normal in judicial elections.
Until Citizens United, fully disclosed
candidate contributions accounted for the
majority of judicial campaign spending.
(See Chart 1.) Since 1990, the earliest
extent of detailed campaign-finance
records in Montana, the average Supreme
Court candidate raised about $139,000
overall, and $212,000 in a contested
election (all figures are in 2014 dollars).
The largest source of campaign contribu-
tions in Supreme Court elections, not
surprisingly, is lawyers and lobbyists, who
account for nearly a third of campaign
contributions. Next are the candidates
themselves, accounting for nearly a quar-
ter of the total. On average less than six
percent of campaign contributions have
come from out-of-state sources. Before
the rise of independent expenditures after
Citizens United, Montana's most expen-
sive judicial campaign was the 2000 race
between Justices Karla Gray and Terry
Trieweiler for chief justice, which neared
one million dollars.
Independent campaign expenditures
are less transparent. Significant outside
money first appeared in the competi-
tive 2000 campaigns for chief justice and
associate justice, nearly all of it from
the Montana Trial Lawyers Association
affiliate the Montana Law PAC. This
PAC, like most PACs, fully disclosed its
contributors, who are almost entirely
Montana lawyers. In the 2000 and 2002
Supreme Court campaigns, the Montana
Law PAC spent around $150,000 total on
multiple candidates. In the bitter 2004
race between Justice James Nelson and
state Rep. Cindy Younkin, the PAC spent
as much as $409,000, the highest amount
of independent expenditures prior to
Citizens United. Several races from 2006
through 2010 either were uncontested or
did not appear to involve significant in-
dependent expenditures. As the Montana
Trial Lawyers Association executive
director later told the New York Times,
"[ijn 2006, 2008, '10, '12, we didn't spend
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anything-nothing, zero."
The first Montana Supreme Court campaign waged en-
tirely after Citizens United came in 2012, when independent
expenditures raised new questions about so-called dark-money
groups. Justice Nelson announced his retirement in early 2011,
noting that judicial campaigns "are expensive, time consum-
ing and increasingly partisan." An organization called the
Montana Growth Network, founded by Republican state Sen.
Jason Priest, criticized candidates Elizabeth Best and Ed Sheehy
for past campaign contributions to Democrats and praised
candidate Laurie McKinnon as "the only non-partisan choice
for Supreme Court justice." Judge McKinnon disavowed the
outside attacks, saying "[mludslinging diminishes the prestige
of our highest court." In 2015, an investigation by Montana's
Commissioner of Political Practices revealed the group raised
$878,000 in largely undisclosed funds, including several
six-figure donations from out-of-state individuals (and their
companies) with Montana property affected by then-pending
stream access litigation.
The 2014 contest between Mike Wheat and Lawrence
VanDyke marked the full fruition of Citizens United in a
Montana judicial campaign. Justice Wheat had been appointed
to the seat in 2010, weeks before Citizens United was decided.
In his 2014 campaign, Justice Wheat criticized Citizens United
and echoed traditional concerns about "outside influences" in
judicial races, explaining that "[w] e Montanans have an inde-
pendent attitude and we don't want outside corporations or
special interest group [s] telling us how to run our affairs." In his
challenge, former State Solicitor General Lawrence VanDyke
highlighted Justice Wheat's partisan political background. "My
problem with Mike Wheat is not that he's a liberal Democrat,"
VanDyke told a reporter, "[m]y problem is he judges like a
liberal Democrat." Both candidates emphasized experience, and
each criticized his opponent for a lack of it. VanDyke also won
a challenge to his qualifications as a lawyer "admitted to the
practice of law in Montana for at least five years," a constitu-
tional provision rooted in historical concerns about outsiders.
With the field set, the candidates and allied advocacy groups
began what would become a million-dollar judicial campaign of
national note. Surprisingly, however, the amount of campaign
contributions raised by both candidates was below average
for a Montana Supreme Court race. VanDyke raised $132,999
from about 700 contributors, 22 percent of whom were lawyers.
Thirty percent of VanDyke's contributions came from outside
Montana, the highest rate of out-of-state contributions for
any Supreme Court candidate on record. Justice Wheat raised
$161,662 from more than 900 contributors, 53 percent of whom
were lawyers. Three percent of Justice Wheat's contributions
came from outside Montana.
As state and national advocacy groups spent hundreds
of thousands of dollars on attack ads, the candidates' cam-
paigns became bit players. On Justice Wheat's side, the trial
lawyers' Montana Law PAC raised more than $161,483 from
trial lawyers and law firms. It transferred most of its money to
a new political committee called Montanans for Liberty and
Justice ("MLJ"), also primarily funded by lawyers, with smaller
contributions from the MEA-MFT union PAC. In total, includ-
ing in-kind contributions from the Montana Law PAC, MLJ
spent $519,840 of independent expenditures on behalf of Mike
Wheat. The contributions to MLJ, erroneously called a "dark
money" group by the VanDyke campaign, were disclosed in
nearly all cases down to the individual level. A third outside
group, Montana Lawyers for Experienced Judges, did spend
an undisclosed amount to run an online attack ad against
VanDyke.
Mr. VanDyke's side saw the unprecedented entry of a
national political party in a Montana Supreme Court race. The
Republican State Leadership Committee ("RSLC") formed the
Judicial Fairness Initiative Montana PAC to spend $430,263
supporting VanDyke. Unlike the trial-lawyer groups, the RSLC
PAC was funded almost entirely by lump-sum transfers from
its parent organization in Washington, D.C. Americans for
Prosperity ("AFP"), which reportedly spent about $170,000 on
television advertising alone, did not register with or report to
the Montana Commissioner of Political Practices. Implausibly,
it maintained its exemption from disclosure by purporting to
be an issue ad, asking the viewer to "call Mike Wheat and tell
him to keep his partisan politics out of our Supreme Court,"
and providing the court's phone number as if to invite exparte
public comment on cases before the court. A late entrant on
VanDyke's side was Montanans for a Fair Judiciary, led by a
former executive director of the Montana Republican Party,
which disclosed spending about $60,000 raised from a handful
of mostly out-of-state donors.
By the time the candidates met for a forum in September
2014, questions of campaign finance had taken center stage.
Justice Wheat opened by framing his perspective on "what this
race really is all about.... how our court may be under attack
from out-of-state money, from out-of-state corporations who
want to come into this state and influence who's going to be on
the court." VanDyke responded that voters should have their
"hypocrisy filter on," saying that "[t]he issue is whether or not
the trial lawyers are going to be the only ones who are spending
money." For VanDyke this was an issue of "free-speech rights
of organizations to say what they believe." Justice Wheat, on the
other hand, criticized Citizens United, siding with his colleague
and fellow candidate Justice Jim Rice, who argued that "[t]he
state of Montana has a compelling interest in protecting and
preserving a fair and impartial judiciary."
As negative advertising by independent-expenditure groups
increased late in the campaign, the VanDyke campaign re-
sponded to so-called "dark money groups" funded by "the
same group of wealthy trial lawyers who have poured buckets
of money into Montana Supreme Court elections for decades."
It criticized "shadowy groups supported by Montana trial
lawyers," claiming that "94 percent of money supporting Mike
Wheat is from trial lawyers," and that "83 percent of Mike
Wheat's lawyer donors have recently had cases in front of him."
Justice Wheat's campaign also attacked independent expendi-
tures, characterizing them as "[t] hese out of state corporations
... distorting the truth about me and my record." Criticism of
his opponent was secondary to "the Koch brothers and others
who want to buy my seat on the Supreme Court for an inexpe-
rienced lawyer." His closing argument asked voters to "tell these
corporations that neither your vote nor my seat are for sale."
By the end of the campaign, estimates put total spending at
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around $1.6 million, making it the most expensive judicial race
in state history. Justice Wheat had $780,981 spent on his side,
including $162,658 in direct contributions. Nearly all of these
funds were disclosed and originated in-state, mostly from law-
yers. VanDyke had approximately $794,081 spent on his side,
including $133,818 in direct contributions. While the ultimate
source for most of the outside spending in support of VanDyke
was not disclosed, presumably it originated almost entirely
from out of state, given the dominant national funding sources
for the RSLC and AFP campaigns. After nearly $300,000 in
candidate contributions and $1.3 million in independent ex-
penditures, the money race ended in a draw. Justice Wheat won
the general election with 59 percent of the vote, with VanDyke
gaining just three points since the primary election.
Lessons from the past for the future
What most distinguishes the VanDyke-Wheat campaign
from other campaigns is the extent to which the candidates and
their allies openly aired usually subliminal questions of cam-
paign finance, partisanship, and related issues. There is reason
to believe that campaign finance is an especially salient issue to
Montana voters. The colorful history of corporate corruption
in Montana at the turn of the 20th century, which remained a
powerful force shaping the 1972 Constitutional Convention, re-
emerged after Citizens United. In 2012, Montanans overwhelm-
ingly approved Initiative 166, a symbolic rejection of Citizens
United, by a margin of nearly three to one. This history makes
Montana a particularly uninviting target for what Montanans
might consider to be out-of-state dark-money groups. Beyond
this history, however, Montana's recent experience may hold
policy lessons for future judicial campaigns and elections.
After Citizens United, any reforms to judicial elections
must address the primacy of independent expenditures. For
example, if a latter-day Copper King wanted to elect a latter-day
Judge Clancy, there would be no need for direct contributions
or even corporate independent expenditures. A direct interven-
tion, such as an independent expenditure of $1 million by a sin-
gle litigant, may require recusal under the 2009 case of Caperton
v. Massey. Instead, the Copper King could run his corporation's
treasury funds into a trade organization, through a like-minded
national party committee, and into a state affiliate, thus avoid-
ing disclosure. The Copper King also could hedge his bets with
contributions to a single-candidate Super PAC, signaling his
interest in the campaign to related committees that might then
double down on the race, and also signaling his support to the
candidate. These maneuvers are likely to satisfy ordinary recusal
standards, given the nature of "independent" expenditures and
the aggregation of any one donor's contributions with others.
Because Citizens United opens new channels for unlimited
campaign spending in judicial and political campaigns alike,
there are common responses to it. These include more disclo-
sure for big-money groups, less disclosure of smaller individual
campaign contributions, and public financing for judicial cam-
paigns. Eliminating judicial campaigns, a solution proposed by
many frustrated with recent campaign finance developments,
may not resolve the most important concerns about politi-
cal influence in judicial selection. The trend toward increased
spending in judicial campaigns presents the challenge of undue
influence, but it also presents an opportunity to revisit the ways
in which campaign finance reform can mitigate, or at least not
aggravate, that trend.
First, Citizens United actually endorsed broader campaign
finance disclosure. This enables states to require more trans-
parency from conduit organizations like the Republican State
Leadership Committee's Montana-based PAC, which disclosed
little more than a massive contribution from its parent organi-
zation's aggregation of corporate funds. Improved disclosure is
important not because it enables recusals at the courthouse-
though it may in extreme cases-but because it enables rejoin-
ders on the campaign trail. On both sides of the VanDyke-
Wheat campaign, the candidates and even the Super PACs
used campaign-finance disclosure to make each side's financial
supporters a central issue in the campaign. At the other end of
the money race, higher disclosure thresholds for small donors
could boost the influence of constituents and practitioners who
know the candidates best. Judicial candidates already start with
relatively narrow donor bases, leaving campaigns dependent
on outside spending by a few large donors. In a million-dollar
campaign, an anonymous contribution of a $100 poses little risk
of corruption, but enough of them will go a long way toward
countering outside spending.
Second, one of the most important ideas to come out of
Montana's 1972 Constitutional Convention, in concept if not
in law, is limited public financing of judicial elections. Any
new proposal for public financing must take care not to limit
expenditures or penalize candidates who self-fund or benefit
from independent expenditures. It also must minimize the risk
of strategic exploitation. Preserving an independent judiciary,
an original purpose of judicial elections, may justify the public
expense necessary to finance judicial candidate campaigns.
As delegates argued in 1972, there are significant distinctions
between judicial campaigns and other political campaigns; these
differences might draw even those generally opposed to public
financing to support it for judicial elections. While a million
dollars of outside money looks expensive compared to prior
judicial campaigns in Montana, a million dollars of "inside
money" in the form of public funding could be a bargain if it
helps secure judicial independence.
There is a final option that would be unthinkable for other
public offices: abolish judicial elections by constitutional
amendment. It has been decades since voters in any state sur-
rendered their power to elect judges. In light of the origins of
judicial elections as a response to political appointees, aboli-
tionists might be careful what they wish for. A critic of Citizens
United - on grounds that undue influence is far more perva-
sive than the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged - also must
recognize that appointive selection concentrates that influence
on the appointer. The federal model of executive appoint-
ment and legislative confirmation for life terms only raises the
political stakes. The stakes would be even higher for state judges
whose general jurisdiction and common law powers allow them
a greater impact on state electorates than their federal counter-
parts. Moreover, merit selection still requires retention elections
that threaten to compromise judicial independence, such as the
Judicial, page 36
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Roland Graham
Roland "Rollie" Graham died on July 30 at the age of 86 in
Helena.
Rollie was born in Minneapolis on May 12, 1930, to
Arthur George Graham and Amelia Martina Bille Graham.
He attended and graduated from the University
of Minnesota with a degree in Business
Administration, during which time he served in
ROTC.
In 1952, he began two years of active duty in
the United States Navy as an ensign, and spent 10
months patrolling the waters off of Korea during
Graham the Korean conflict. Upon his return from active
duty, he married Shari Jones. After he completed
his final year of active service in San Diego, he spent the next
three years attending the University of Minnesota School of
Law, serving on the Law Review, and graduating with a juris
doctorate in 1957.
Rollie practiced law in Minnesota and Wisconsin until 1999,
working as counsel for the Milwaukee Railroad, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, and the First Wisconsin Holding
Company. He moved to Helena with his daughter and son-in-
law, Sue and Gabe Woodrow, and eventually becoming bored
with retirement. Missing the practice of law, he sat for the
Montana bar exam. At the age of 72, Rollie was proudly admit-
ted to the Montana State Bar. Shortly after, he began a 10-year
"second" law career as of-counsel with the law firm Gough,
Shanahan, Johnson & Waterman in Helena, finally retiring at
age 82.
Rollie loved the practice of law but, even more so, he loved
his family and cherished his friends and colleagues. Special
memories are of camping; summers spent boating, fishing, and
water skiing; years of piano, trumpet and percussion recitals,
band and choir concerts, and dance recitals; Boy Scouts and
coaching little league baseball games and watching synchro-
nized swimming and school theater productions; winter skiing
in Colorado and Montana; cross country skiing in the Twin
Cities' parks; bicycling in the Upper Peninsula; family road trips
to Texas, Montana, and Alberta, Canada; golfing; and even a
few brief years attempting to master photography. He was a role
model, willing audience and constant friend to grandchildren
Graham and Lauren who were privileged to have Grandpa ever
present as they were growing up.
During these years, Rollie gave back generously to the com-
munity with his time and talents. When his family was young,
Rollie served in the Optimist Club setting up and manning
Christmas tree lots for several years. He found great satis-
faction and joy as an active member of Rotary Club, first in
Minneapolis for a number of years, and then in the Rotary Club
of Helena from 2002 until his passing.
He was buried with military honors at Montana State
Veterans Cemetery. In lieu of flowers, memorials maybe made
in Rollie's name to the Helena Rotary Foundation, P.O. Box
333, Helena, MT 59624. Please visit www.retzfuneralhome.com
to offer a condolence or to share a memory of Rollie.
Judicial from page 17
2010 ouster of three Iowa justices - led
by outside campaign spending - after
its Supreme Court recognized a right to
same-sex marriage. To use the hydraulics
metaphor sometimes applied to cam-
paign finance, it seems safe to say that,
like water or money, political influence
will find its way through any judicial-
selection landscape.
Conclusion
Montana's judicial elections reflect a
territorial suspicion of outside influence,
a progressive-era concern about corpo-
rate corruption, and extraordinarily deep
deliberation among ordinary citizens
about competing models for judicial
selection in the framing of its 1972
Constitution. The result is a hybrid selec-
tion model sharing elements of contested
election, retention election, merit, and
(with strong gubernatorial representa-
tion on the nominating commission)
straight appointment models. After the
invalidation of its partisan endorse-
ment prohibition in the wake of Citizens
United, Montana now shares some
elements of a partisan-election model,
for better or worse. This prompted a
vigorous public debate, in the context of
the campaign between Mike Wheat and
Lawrence VanDyke, about the Montana
Constitution and Citizens United, the in-
fluence of trial lawyers and corporations,
and the merits of electing judges at all.
The campaign did not settle that debate,
of course. Instead, it raised old questions
about judicial selection in a new era of
campaign finance. In 2016, as in 1866,
1972, and 2014, those questions continue
to call for answers.
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